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The outrage has been enormous: “Secret courts” (Geheimgerichte) meeting in
“back rooms” (Hinterzimmern) granting “special rights” (Sonderrechte) to large
corporations. In the meantime, lawyers make absurd amounts of money while well-
meaning domestic regulators get sanctioned for protecting the environment or
labor rights and the taxpayer has to pick up the tab. This, in a nutshell, sums up the
image that the vast majority (with exceptions) of the media has presented, over the
course of the past months, of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) in general
and the envisaged investment chapters in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP), the bilateral free trade and investment agreement currently under
negotiation between the European Union and the United States, in particular.
Showcase is the (second) Vattenfall v. Germany arbitration, currently ongoing, in
which Vattenfall, the Swedish energy giant, seeks to hold Germany accountable
for the u-turn in the latter’s nuclear energy policy since 2011. If already a Swedish
company is suing the German government for putting an end to nuclear power, so
the concerns, what will happen to our valued high regulatory standards once the
TTIP gives U.S. companies the opportunity to get a bite of the apple? Recently,
the German minister of the environment, Barbara Hendricks, has expressed her
concerns with regard to the TTIP’s investment chapters, both concerning the existing
regulatory framework for the environment as well as regarding future changes in
policy that aim at environment protection but might run counter to the interests of
major U.S. companies investing in Europe.
The media outrage and (parts of) the German government’s skepticism are
somewhat surprising. Germany has been at the forefront of investment protection
from the very beginning. It was the first nation to initiate and conclude a bilateral
investment treaty (BIT) – with Pakistan, in 1959 – and is BIT world champion, having
concluded a higher number of BITs than any other country in the world, including
the U.S. German companies have enjoyed investment protection abroad and have
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made use of ISDS, arguably contributing to such “regulatory chill” in other countries
that  concerned citizens now identify as the nail to the coffin of the modern (German)
regulatory State.
As a matter of fact, the concerns appear to have arisen only once Germany is
being held to respect its own longstanding policy and once people are starting to
realize that bilateral treaty obligations are no one-way street but are indeed bi-
lateral. However, the debate on the TTIP should focus on what is actually under
consideration to become part of this Agreement. We got a glimpse of these plans
recently, when several newspaper websites published the confidential EU draft
proposal on parts of the TTIP, including the sections on investment protection. I will
comment on selected issues of the draft’s investment provisions, contrasting them
against standard investment treaty provisions as well as the recently concluded EU-
Canada Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA), in order to put them
into perspective for the current debate in the media, civil society, and at government
level.
The TTIP Investment Provisions – Selected Issues
Relevant draft investment provisions are to be found in Chapters I, II and VII of the
draft as well as the list of features the EU envisages for ISDS, which is attached at
the very end of the document.
Investment Protection Standards
As regards the standards of investment protection, the EU’s TTIP draft deviates
considerably from most international investment agreements. Article 3(3) and (4)
exclude the touchy issues of public procurement and subsidies from the scope
of investment protection. Compared to, e.g., the US Model BIT 2012, the relative
standards of most-favored nation (MFN) treatment is crippled in the EU TTIP draft.
 Only Article 13(1) requires MFN in the context of investments affected by armed
conflict, national emergency or revolt. Further, similar to CETA, Article 12(2), on fair
and equitable treatment (FET), seeks to boil down this broad standard, which has
been the constant target of criticism by international investment law skeptics, to a
handful of sub-standards, including denial of justice, lack of due process, breach of
legitimate expectations arising from specific representations by the government and
lack of transparency in judicial and administrative practice. Considering that the U.S.,
since the early 2000s, has pursued a consequent policy of linking (and thus limiting)
FET to the international minimum standard of treatment (for instance, Article 5(2)
(a) of the U.S. Model BIT 2012), further restrictions to the FET standard are to be
expected in the final TTIP draft.
Moreover, the draft’s provisions on expropriation, Article 14 and Annex X, are
particularly interesting. Here, the EU draft attempts to contain some investment
tribunals’ zealous quest to extend the scope of what is to be considered an indirect
expropriation. No. 2 of the Annex lists several factors that a tribunal assessing the
impact of measures alleged to constitute an indirect expropriation should take into
account. In particular, it acknowledges a “party’s right to regulate” and sets out a
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four-step proportionality test, similar to the German doctrine, stressing the host
State’s “legitimate public policy objectives.” While investment tribunals have indeed
referred to and applied a proportionality test for the purposes of interpreting what
constitutes an “indirect expropriation” several times (however, often in a somewhat
apodictic and blurry manner), a major (trade and) investment agreement enshrining
basically the German doctrine on proportionality would undoubtedly be a significant
development.
Further, again similar to CETA, Article 64 of the draft fleshes out general exceptions
which would justify deviation from or even infringement of investment protection
standards and which is inspired by Article XX of the GATT.
Investor-State Dispute Settlement
ISDS  has been in the focus of the media debate on the TTIP investment provisions.
The EU draft is least advanced in this regard, as it merely states the EU’s goals in
a list attached at the end of the document. Nonetheless, the positions are relatively
clearly fleshed out. They are intended to respond to the concerns presented in the
beginning of this blog but are, as a matter of fact, no novelty to those who follow the
EU’s investment policy after Lisbon but might surprise others who bemoan alleged
deficiencies in ISDS under BITs and thus oppose the TTIP on that basis.
To start with, according to the EU, ISDS should only cover post-establishment
treatment of investment and should exclude issues of market access. This would
de facto render moot the definition of “investor” sub Article 1(4)(q) that I referred
to above. Further, the list contains a number of limitations and restrictions to ISDS
that are currently the exception under most international investment agreements in
place: (1) A statute of limitations for raising an investment claim; (2) a determination,
before the claim is “submit[ed],” whether the EU or the Member State should act
as respondent in the case. According to relevant EU legislation, it will be the EU
who makes this determination and in any case exercises control over how the
arbitration will be conducted. (3) The draft suggests a ceiling for compensation
as well as multiple claims against the same respondent State. Further, the draft
points to instruments by which the Parties to the TTIP may exercise more control
over the arbitration and the costs it might entail as is currently the case for most
investment treaty arbitrations. For example, No. 10) of the list envisages a fixed
roster of arbitrators set up specifically for the purposes of ISDS under the TTIP.
The Parties would define “a number of specific qualifications” the arbitrators must
have and a Code of Conduct the arbitrators must adhere to. Both Parties should be
permitted to file submissions in ISDS and they may adopt joint binding interpretations
of investment provisions as well as resort to State-to-State arbitration. Finally, the
draft adopts the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules on Transparency, which will make
public hearings and publication of all submissions the rule rather than the exception,
and it considers whether “to permit that awards under this agreement would be
subject to appeals on questions of law.”
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Conclusion: “All’s well…”?
There are essentially two things we can take away from this glance at the EU’s
draft: First, it addresses many concerns raised against investment protection in
general and ISDS in particular that should calm the temper of those who are not
opposing trade and investment liberalization per se: Inter alia, (i) the EU’s TTIP
draft considerably limits the scope of several substantial standards, such as in
particular fair and equitable treatment; (ii) it considers that the Contracting Parties
may adopt joint binding interpretations of TTIP provisions and thus to prevent
expansive readings by arbitral tribunals; and (iii) it intends to incorporate a number
of transparency measures regarding ISDS, including public hearings and publication
of all decisions and submissions. Both substantively and procedurally, the draft
does indeed restrict investment protection to a considerable degree compared to
the regime in place under most international investment agreements. Secondly,
questions remain rather in view of technical legal matters. What does it mean to
prevent “excess compensation”? Setting an absolute amount (apart from being
arbitrary) would invite nationalization of assets that considerably exceed that
threshold. Creating a relative (or normative) standard may prove difficult – what does
“excess” actually mean then, if not an absolute threshold? Moreover, how should we
understand the relationship between “public interest,” a necessary requirement for
an expropriation pursuant to Article 14(1)(a) and a “legitimate public policy objective”
under the Annex, which might exclude a finding of indirect expropriation? How can
Article 18(1) of the draft, which orders that all BITs between the US and EU Member
States cease to “apply” once the TTIP enters into force, be reconciled with Article 59
of the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties? Would this require the EU Member
States, or at least those having BITs in force with the US, becoming Parties to the
TTIP?
*This article expresses the author’s private opinion.
[Hinweis der Redaktion: Das Thema TTIP ist auch Gegenstand einer
Tagungsbesprechung auf JUWISS von   Henner Gött und Till Patrik Holterhus]
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